COMMENTARY
“The remarkable feature about physical laws is that they apply everywhere whether or not you choose to believe in them. After the laws of physics, everything else is an opinion.” —Neil deGrasse Tyson
For the past few years, our conversations with asset allocators have revolved around four core topics:
- Defining the Energy Transition with an emphasis on the dual mandate of decarbonizing global energy systems while simultaneously addressing global energy poverty
- Discussing the deficiencies in many conventionally held assumptions about the path to Net Zero with a specific focus on the limitations of renewables and the need for an “all of the above” approach to reducing carbon emissions today while investing in promising technologies for the future
- Highlighting the capital and material intensity of the Energy Transition, the impact of a lost decade of investment on the supply base, and the hard facts about resource constraints for many key raw materials
- Emphasizing the hypocritical and counter-productive nature of many ESG- and divestment-related investment policy decisions
Recent events, ranging from the U.K. energy crisis last fall to supply fears created by Russia’s actions in Europe, have brought many of these issues into sharper focus. In fact, we were pleased to read a recent report from JPMorgan Chief Global Market Strategist Marko Kolanovic, whom we hold in high regard. In the introduction to Global Energy Outlook, Marko writes,
“The world is in the midst of an energy crisis. It is an economic crisis, but also one related to geopolitical conflicts, tensions between the developed and developing world, political divisions within the developed world, and economic inequality across the globe…Our main finding is that by 2030, energy demand growth will exceed supply growth by ~20% based on current trends, primarily driven by emerging economies and their efforts to develop and lift their citizens out of poverty…There isn’t a single type of energy that can meet the specific demand profile, and investment will need to be inclusive of all fuels including oil and gas, renewables, nuclear, and other forms of energy. Not all fuels are made equal and for the most part (and within this time horizon), different sources of energy are not fully fungible.”
Increased awareness of the constraints and physical realities of our collective efforts to both expand and decarbonize the world’s energy systems is a prerequisite to creating the policy and investment climate necessary for success. The next step is to move beyond spreadsheets and soapboxes and start figuring out how to capitalize responsibly sourced raw materials, infrastructure projects, and energy solutions so that economic crises do not become humanitarian ones.
For most of the past decade, we have been spoiled by cheap, readily available inputs combined with the deflationary benefits of globalization. Notwithstanding the pandemic, the world economy was booming, greased by walls of liquidity and a relatively benign geopolitical environment. It was an ideal time to be, well, an idealist. The pendulum now appears to be swinging in the other direction.
CONVENTIONAL ENERGY – A SOLVABLE CRISIS
Given that oil is an input for so many intermediate and end products, including the production of other commodities, its influence is far greater than one would expect from something that only represents about 3% of global GDP. Over the last decade or so, the world has benefited from the emergence of shale oil – relatively inexpensive and sourced from functioning, stable democracies. In fact, North American unconventional oil has been the most significant wedge of new supply over the last ten years, meeting the majority of global demand growth from about 2010 to 2019. Of course, supply is a function of capital investment, and shale oil dwarfed all other regions over that period.
Figure 1: Oil Capex by Supply Source/Country
Source: Goldman Sachs, Top Projects 2022, 19 April 2022
However, in retrospect, it is clear that the era of shale oil was a disinflationary pause as opposed to the beginning of a period of structural deflation. Perhaps more importantly, lower commodity prices were the outcome of abundant, cheap capital, not radical improvements in capital efficiency.
Figure 2: Evolution of the Oil Cost Curve
Source: Goldman Sachs, Top Projects 2022, 19 April 2022
Of far more importance, given the intractable nature of such decisions, ESG-driven capital constraints have meaningfully increased the cost of production, more than offsetting any benefit from unconventional supply.
Figure 3: Cost of Capital Impact on Breakeven Prices
Source: Goldman Sachs, Top Projects 2022, 19 April 2022
While of course this is the explicit objective of divestment-related investment policies, the unfortunate reality is that:
- billions of people rely on oil for their basic energy needs every day
- not everyone who shows up at Davos is your friend
- in commodities, cost = price, such that increasing the cost of capital is a direct and regressive tax on those least able to afford it (and least likely to be represented on investment committees)
For context, the $30/barrel spread on the above graph presents about $220bn in incremental cost that is being born by the consumer every year. Divestment decisions may make sense in a vacuum, but unfortunately supply and demand are real world conditions. The combination of a decade of value destruction and the impact of ESG-driven investment policies by institutions and governments alike have resulted in a prolonged period of underinvestment, the implication of which is only now becoming obvious.
Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine is exactly the type of unforecastable event which upends commodity markets, the sort of shock which galvanizes seemingly unrelated threads into a full-blown calamity. While it was easy to overlook during a period of abundant supply followed by a pandemic-driven demand shock, longer-term spare capacity is low and falling.
Figure 4: Global Oil Demand vs Non-OPEC Supply
Source: Cornerstone Analytics, 22 April 2022
Figure 5: OPEC and Russia Spare Capacity
Source: Goldman Sachs, Top Projects 2022, 19 April 2022
Since inventories represent the intersection of supply and demand, it’s clear that the run-rate pace of investment is struggling to meet current energy needs.
Figure 6: Crude Oil Inventory (ex-OPEC and China)
Source: Bernstein, 14 April 2022
Figure 7: U.S. Natural Gas Storage Inventory (Bcf)
Source: U.S. Capital Advisors, 25 April 2022
Given the fact that energy demand is growing, not falling, a gap will emerge if capital does not flow back into the sector.
Figure 8: Energy Balance from 2019 to 2030
Source: JPMorgan, Global Energy Outlook, 20 April 2022
While it is not surprising that energy security is now the topic du jour, the reality is that a supply response is possible with incremental investment. The oil and gas markets are not resource constrained – just capital constrained. In fact, JPMorgan estimates that $1.3 trillion across primary energy sources will balance the market by 2030, which in the context of a $150+ trillion energy transition seems like an achievable goal, particularly in light of current commodity prices.
Figure 9: Incremental Investment Required to Meet 2030 Demand
Source: JPMorgan, Global Energy Outlook, 20 April 2022
Furthermore, alternatives are available and increasingly competitive on an economic basis (EVs), suggesting that current market tightness can be alleviated through incremental production, substitution and a slow or partial return of Russian volumes to the market. Other segments of the commodity markets face much different prospects, a fact which continues to be overlooked by investors and policymakers alike.
RAW MATERIAL SUPPLY – A CONSTRAINT TO THE ENERGY TRANSITION
While magazines and pundits race to forecast the end of hydrocarbons, there is little question that the future is based on “the electrification of everything.” If there is one metal that is synonymous with electricity, it’s copper.
Figure 10: Historical and Future Copper Demand
Source: BMO Capital Markets, Rethinking the Long-Term Copper Challenge, 7 October 2021
From our perspective, however, the question isn’t what copper demand looks like under various Energy Transition demand scenarios, but rather what the Energy Transition looks like under various copper supply scenarios. Quite simply, it is the metals sector where concerns around “security of supply” are most acute.
Despite decade-high prices, inventories are extraordinarily low, representing about eight days of demand. This is not normal.
Figure 11: Total Copper Inventories (lhs, tons) and Commodity Price (rhs, ¢)
Source: Scotia Bank Research, 15 April 2022
Part of the issue relates to ongoing supply disruptions from existing mines. Chile, the world’s largest producer at almost 30% of global supply, is suffering from declining grades and water shortages which are curtailing production. Imagine the oil markets if, at full capacity, OPEC production looked like this:
Figure 12: Chile Copper Mine Production
Source: Goldman Sachs Commodities Research, Copper: Sleepwalking Towards a Stockout, 7 April 2022
More alarmingly, the outlook for longer-term supply growth is pretty tepid in both absolute and relative terms.
Figure 13: Global Copper Supply Gap
Source: Goldman Sachs Commodities Research, Copper: Sleepwalking Towards a Stockout, 7 April 2022
This supply forecast is a function of both a lack of investment by the industry and lack of success with the drill bit. The mining industry was the first upstream segment to adopt the “value over volume” mantra back in the early 2010’s, and exploration spending plummeted, particularly greenfield exploration.
Figure 14: Exploration Spend by Stage ($mm)
Source: Bernstein Research, Exploration Crisis, or the Best Time to Plant a Tree, 13 April 2022
While concerns about future supply might be ameliorated by the recent uptick in spending, overall spending levels also reflect a cold reality: we’ve stopped discovering Tier I copper deposits.
Figure 15: A History of Copper Exploration
Source: Bernstein Research, April 2022
There has been limited exploration success for more than 20 years, with only the DRC’s Kamoa-Kakula qualifying as a true Tier I resource. And, to make matters worse, a combination of capital intensity, resource nationalism and increasing regulatory and environmental requirements are making the development of the few new mines likely to come into production more costly and drawn-out affairs. As exiting Anglo American CEO Mark Cutifani put it during his final days in office, “It used to take seven years to find a mine and get it into development. Now it takes 15 years or more.” None of this bodes well for the Energy Transition.
Of course, the issues of structural deficits and struggles to meet demand irrespective of price is not limited to copper – it is a challenge facing numerous commodities, many of which are central to the Energy Transition.
Figure 16: Estimates of Supply/Demand Balances (% Demand)
Source: Goldman Sachs Research, Commodity Views, 13 January 2021
It is important to note that this snapshot was taken prior to the Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, which raises another critical issue. To the extent that there is supply, to what extent will it be available in the free markets?
In our opinion, the lunacy of trusting a despot (Putin) to ignore the most obvious weapon in his arsenal (natural gas supply) will go down in history as a Chamberlain-esque oversight by European officials. However, while high energy prices may weigh on the European economy for the next few years, at least there are alternatives in the form of increased U.S. LNG exports and the reversal of planned nuclear shutdowns. In the metals market, China dominates processing capacity in commodities like lithium and rare earth oxides and has de facto control over copper, nickel and other mission-critical commodities across the continent of Africa and into Indonesia.
We won’t know until it is far too late whether China explicitly will choose to weaponize its position, but what is the rationale behind conceding it in the first place? To quote the owner of a large, undeveloped nickel asset in an OECD country,
Since the LME nickel meltdown things have, quite literally, gone crazy. The auto industry is panicked. Honestly, I’m not sure how this will unfold, but we’ve been telling them for over five years that there will be a shortage of metal. Now they understand the problem.
It’s not just auto OEM’s that should be concerned. Investors, consumers, environmentalists, and governments would be wise to follow suit. The Energy Transition is complicated enough without artificial impediments created by well intentioned, but misinformed, beliefs which overlook the complex nature of systems like power grids and industrial operations, the raw material intensity required to “electrify everything,” and the need to reduce carbon emissions today if we are serious about achieving Net Zero in the future. Technological innovation will be a tremendous part of the equation, but it will not be the sole determinant in the success of this endeavor. If there is any good to come from the human tragedy unfolding in eastern Europe, hopefully it includes a wake-up call to the western world and its allies about the frailty of supply chains related to basic necessities like energy and food.
In summary:
- The Energy Transition requires raw materials
- Those raw materials can be produced most efficiently and with the strongest environmental and safety track record under the watchful eye of western regulators
- Ceding control of key inputs to potential adversaries by pretending that those key inputs aren’t important seems naïve, at best
- Decisions which run counter to enabling and promoting the safe, efficient production of mission critical raw materials simply delay and increase the price tag of the Energy Transition while simultaneously imposing a regressive tax on the poor
SUMMARY
Commodity markets are healing as the world ramps up to address one of its most pressing concerns – climate change – with one of the most complex, capital-intensive, resource-intensive endeavors ever undertaken. We remain steadfast in our belief that efforts to decarbonize our energy systems while at the same time addressing the cold reality of energy poverty must be driven by relative economics and cost/benefit analysis. If not, the Energy Transition will fail, and tens of trillions of dollars will be spent for naught.
More broadly, inflation concerns are rising, and rightly so from the perspective of the commodity markets. Capital constraints and resource exhaustion should drive prices higher, not lower, over the coming years. This runs counter to the experience of the past decade, and as a result, investors still are reluctant to embrace this potential outcome.
This skepticism shows up in the public equity markets, as valuations in many resource-related areas are still extraordinarily attractive. Over time, we expect the market to reflect the realities of the Energy Transition, with the appropriate level of scarcity value ascribed to the building blocks of decarbonization. Until then, we remain excited to deploy capital into what we believe to be one of the most fundamentally attractive set-ups in recent memory.
THIS REPORT IS SOLELY FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES AND SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION TO BUY SECURITIES. THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN REPRESENT THE CURRENT VIEWS OF THE AUTHOR(S) AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION AND ARE PROVIDED FOR LIMITED PURPOSES, ARE NOT DEFINITIVE INVESTMENT ADVICE, AND SHOULD NOT BE RELIED ON AS SUCH. THE INFORMATION PRESENTED IN THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED INTERNALLY AND/OR OBTAINED FROM SOURCES BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE; HOWEVER, SAILINGSTONE CAPITAL PARTNERS LLC (“SAILINGSTONE” OR “SSCP”) DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE ACCURACY, ADEQUACY OR COMPLETENESS OF SUCH INFORMATION. PREDICTIONS, OPINIONS, AND OTHER INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS ARTICLE ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE CONTINUALLY AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY KIND AND MAY NO LONGER BE TRUE AFTER THE DATE INDICATED. ANY FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS SPEAK ONLY AS OF THE DATE THEY ARE MADE, AND SSCP ASSUMES NO DUTY TO AND DOES NOT UNDERTAKE TO UPDATE FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS. FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO NUMEROUS ASSUMPTIONS, RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES, WHICH CHANGE OVER TIME. ACTUAL RESULTS COULD DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM THOSE ANTICIPATED IN FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, TARGET RETURNS ARE BASED ON SSCP’S HISTORICAL DATA REGARDING ASSET CLASS AND STRATEGY. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT TARGETED RETURNS WILL BE REALIZED OR ACHIEVED OR THAT AN INVESTMENT STRATEGY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. TARGET RETURNS AND/OR PROJECTED RETURNS ARE HYPOTHETICAL IN NATURE AND ARE SHOWN FOR ILLUSTRATIVE, INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY. THIS MATERIAL IS NOT INTENDED TO FORECAST OR PREDICT FUTURE EVENTS, BUT RATHER TO INDICATE THE INVESTMENT RETURNS SAILINGSTONE HAS OBSERVED IN THE MARKET GENERALLY. IT DOES NOT REFLECT THE ACTUAL OR EXPECTED RETURNS OF ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT STRATEGY AND DOES NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE RESULTS. SAILINGSTONE CONSIDERS A NUMBER OF FACTORS, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, OBSERVED AND HISTORICAL MARKET RETURNS RELEVANT TO THE APPLICABLE INVESTMENTS, PROJECTED CASH FLOWS, PROJECTED FUTURE VALUATIONS OF TARGET ASSETS AND BUSINESSES, RELEVANT OTHER MARKET DYNAMICS (INCLUDING INTEREST RATE AND CURRENCY MARKETS), ANTICIPATED CONTINGENCIES, AND REGULATORY ISSUES. CERTAIN OF THE ASSUMPTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR MODELING PURPOSES AND ARE UNLIKELY TO BE REALIZED. NO REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY IS MADE AS TO THE REASONABLENESS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS MADE OR THAT ALL ASSUMPTIONS USED IN CALCULATING THE TARGET RETURNS AND/OR PROJECTED RETURNS HAVE BEEN STATED OR FULLY CONSIDERED. CHANGES IN THE ASSUMPTIONS MAY HAVE A MATERIAL IMPACT ON THE TARGET RETURNS AND/OR PROJECTED RETURNS PRESENTED. TARGET RETURNS AND/OR PROJECTED RETURNS MAY NOT MATERIALIZE. INVESTORS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE SECURITIES MARKETS ARE VOLATILE AND UNPREDICTABLE. THERE ARE NO GUARANTEES THAT THE HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE OF AN INVESTMENT, PORTFOLIO, OR ASSET CLASS WILL HAVE A DIRECT CORRELATION WITH ITS FUTURE PERFORMANCE. INVESTING IN SMALL- AND MID-SIZE COMPANIES CAN INVOLVE RISKS SUCH AS LESS PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION THAN LARGER COMPANIES, VOLATILITY, AND LESS LIQUIDITY. INVESTING IN A MORE LIMITED NUMBER OF ISSUERS AND SECTORS CAN BE SUBJECT TO INCREASED SENSITIVITY TO MARKET FLUCTUATION. PORTFOLIOS THAT CONCENTRATE INVESTMENTS IN A CERTAIN SECTOR MAY BE SUBJECT TO GREATER RISK THAN PORTFOLIOS THAT INVEST MORE BROADLY, AS COMPANIES IN THAT SECTOR MAY SHARE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AND MAY REACT SIMILARLY TO MARKET DEVELOPMENTS OR OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR VALUES. INVESTMENTS IN COMPANIES IN NATURAL RESOURCES INDUSTRIES MAY INVOLVE RISKS INCLUDING CHANGES IN COMMODITIES PRICES, CHANGES IN DEMAND FOR VARIOUS NATURAL RESOURCES, CHANGES IN ENERGY PRICES, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS. FOREIGN SECURITIES ARE SUBJECT TO POLITICAL, REGULATORY, ECONOMIC, AND EXCHANGE-RATE RISKS, SOME OF WHICH MAY NOT BE PRESENT IN DOMESTIC INVESTMENTS. YOU CANNOT INVEST DIRECTLY IN AN INDEX. THOSE INDICES THAT ARE NOT BENCHMARKS FOR THE STRATEGY ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STRATEGY AND ARE SHOWN SOLELY AS A COMPARISON AMONG ASSET CLASSES. CERTAIN INDICES HAVE BEEN SELECTED AS BENCHMARKS BECAUSE THEY REPRESENT THE GENERAL ASSET CLASS IN WHICH SSCP’S STRATEGY INVESTS; HOWEVER, EVEN SUCH BENCHMARKS WILL BE MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM PORTFOLIOS IN THE STRATEGY SINCE SSCP IS NOT CONSTRAINED BY THE ANY PARTICULAR INDEX IN MANAGING THE STRATEGY. THE S&P NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR INDEX™ (S&P NANRSI) IS AN UNMANAGED MODIFIED-CAPITALIZATION WEIGHTED INDEX OF COMPANIES IN THE GLOBAL INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION STANDARD (GICS©) ENERGY AND MATERIALS SECTORS, EXCLUDING THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY AND STEEL SUB-INDUSTRY. INDEX WEIGHTS ARE FLOAT-ADJUSTED AND CAPPED AT 7.5%. ORDINARY CASH DIVIDENDS ARE APPLIED ON THE EX-DATE. AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2007, THE STRATEGY CHANGED ITS BENCHMARK FROM THE LIPPER NATURAL RESOURCES FUND INDEX TO THE S&P NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR INDEX BECAUSE THE S&P NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR INDEX IS COMPOSED OF SECURITIES OF COMPANIES IN THE NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR WHILE THE LIPPER NATURAL RESOURCES FUND INDEX IS COMPOSED OF MUTUAL FUNDS THAT INVEST IN THE NATURAL RESOURCES SECTOR. THE S&P GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES INDEX (S&P GNR) INCLUDES 90 OF COMPANIES IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND COMMODITIES BUSINESSES THAT MEET SPECIFIC INVESTABILITY REQUIREMENTS WHOSE MARKET CAPITALIZATION IS GREATER THAN US$100 MILLION WITH A FLOAT-ADJUSTED MARKET CAP OF US$100 MILLION. EQUITY EXPOSURE IS ACROSS 3 PRIMARY COMMODITY-RELATED SECTORS: AGRIBUSINESS, ENERGY, AND METALS & MINING. LIQUIDITY THRESHOLDS ARE THE 3-MONTH AVERAGE DAILY VALUE TRADED OF US$5 MILLION. STOCKS MUST BE TRADING ON A DEVELOPED MARKET EXCHANGE. EMERGING MARKET STOCKS ARE CONSIDERED ONLY IF THEY HAVE A DEVELOPED MARKET LISTING. THE MSCI WORLD COMMODITY PRODUCERS INDEX (MSCI-WCP) IS AN EQUITY-BASED INDEX DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE PERFORMANCE RELATED TO COMMODITY PRODUCERS’ STOCKS. THE MSCI WORLD COMMODITY PRODUCERS INDEX IS A FREE FLOAT-ADJUSTED MARKET CAPITALIZATION-WEIGHTED INDEX COMPRISED OF COMMODITY PRODUCER COMPANIES BASED ON THE GICS. THE BLOOMBERG COMMODITY INDEX (FORMERLY THE DOW JONES-UBS COMMODITY INDEX) IS CALCULATED ON AN EXCESS RETURN BASIS AND COMPOSED OF FUTURES CONTRACTS ON 22 PHYSICAL COMMODITIES. IT REFLECTS THE RETURN OF UNDERLYING COMMODITY FUTURES PRICE MOVEMENTS. THE S&P 500 INDEX IS A FREE-FLOAT ADJUSTED MARKET-CAPITALIZATION-WEIGHTED INDEX DESIGNED TO MEASURE THE PERFORMANCE OF 500 LEADING COMPANIES IN LEADING INDUSTRIES OF THE U.S. ECONOMY. THE STOCKS INCLUDED HAVE A MARKET CAPITALIZATION IN EXCESS OF $4 BILLION AND COVER OVER 75% OF U.S. EQUITIES. THE S&P GSCI® CRUDE OIL INDEX PROVIDES INVESTORS WITH A RELIABLE AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE BENCHMARK FOR INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE IN THE CRUDE OIL MARKET. THE S&P GSCI® NATURAL GAS INDEX PROVIDES INVESTORS WITH A RELIABLE AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE BENCHMARK FOR INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET. THE S&P GSCI® COPPER INDEX, A SUB-INDEX OF THE S&P GSCI, PROVIDES INVESTORS WITH A RELIABLE AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE BENCHMARK FOR INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE IN THE COPPER COMMODITY MARKET. THE S&P GSCI® GOLD INDEX, A SUB-INDEX OF THE S&P GSCI, PROVIDES INVESTORS WITH A RELIABLE AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE BENCHMARK TRACKING THE COMEX GOLD FUTURE. THE INDEX IS DESIGNED TO BE TRADABLE, READILY ACCESSIBLE TO MARKET PARTICIPANTS, AND COST EFFICIENT TO IMPLEMENT. THE S&P GSCI® CORN INDEX, A SUB-INDEX OF THE S&P GSCI, PROVIDES INVESTORS WITH A RELIABLE AND PUBLICLY AVAILABLE BENCHMARK FOR INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE IN THE CORN COMMODITY MARKET. BENCHMARK RETURNS ARE GROSS OF WITHHOLDING TAXES. THE PERFORMANCE SHOWN IS FOR THE STATED TIME PERIOD ONLY; DUE TO MARKET VOLATILITY, EACH ACCOUNT’S PERFORMANCE MAY BE DIFFERENT. RETURNS ARE EXPRESSED IN U.S. DOLLARS.
.webp)
